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Executive Summary
Tough times are expected in the year(s) to come, but focusing entirely on public and private budget cuts is not a 
politically sustainable policy. On top of its direct 
impoverishing impact, austerity has an indirect 
impact, which is very corrosive in the long run 
for consumers. It induces producers of goods and 
services to retreat to their home markets, reducing 
the level of competition in the markets they left 
behind.
There is thus an urgent need to build a pro-growth 
agenda, for which the services sector is the best 
candidate, since it accounts for 60-70 percent of 
the G20 GDP. Such an agenda means reforms: in 
order to take the right decisions when redesigning 
their strategies, service providers need clarity and 
predictability on how their markets will operate. 
History shows that introducing pro-growth 
domestic reforms is hugely bolstered by opening 
— or reopening — domestic markets to foreign 
competitors.
This is why a “sleeping” Doha is not a reason for 
not starting negotiations now on how to improve 
market access in services. This paper argues that 
the two largest world economies, the United States 
and the EU, should launch bilateral negotiations on 
services. The expected gains for consumers and the 
opportunities for service providers are huge in both 
sides of the Atlantic because their services sectors 
are likewise huge and because the protection still 
prevailing in many services areas is still high. 
Potential gains come from three sources:
•	 cutting the currently applied barriers on 
market entry;
•	 lowering the U.S. and EU bound commitments 
on services liberalization dating from the 
Uruguay Round to the level of the (much) 
lower barriers actually in force today, a source 
of invaluable certainty in a crisis plagued by so 
much uncertainty; and
•	 “defragmenting” the EU internal market by 
opening the markets of the most protectionist 
EU Member States to competition from the 
United States and from the other EU Member 
States — and vice-versa for the U.S. “internal 
market.”
In this context, this paper gives a sense of the 
services for which some “willingness to negotiate” 
could be targeted for moving ahead.
Transatlantic negotiations on services are likely 
to generate dynamics that will go beyond the 
United States and the EU. It would be relatively 
costless and highly beneficial to extend these 
talks to roughly eight countries — a group small 
enough to keep negotiations manageable and large 
enough to ensure that more than 80 percent of 
world production in services would be covered in 
the negotiations. Shifting from bilateral to such 
plurilateral negotiations would be attractive for 
all the participants because these eight additional 
countries have a service sector equal to the size of 
the EU or U.S. markets, with a level of protection 
similar or higher.
These powerful dynamics justify the complications 
inherent in extending bilateral transatlantic services 
negotiations to include a limited number of other 
countries because such a move would reduce 
the risk of distortions that a purely transatlantic 
deal would create, and because, ultimately, such 
an initiative would open the door to multilateral 
negotiations in services when the time comes.
The United States and the EU are the “obvious” 
candidates to launch a liberalization process. 
This may not be necessarily the case, however. 
Alternatives are emerging from transpacific 
initiatives in services to East-Asia initiatives to 
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Asia-Europe initiatives. All these options share 
one common feature: as soon as one of these 
dialogs takes off, dynamic forces will induce the 
nonparticipating largest economies to join the 
ongoing talks. In other words, the starting point of 
the whole negotiating process may be different, but 
the dynamic effects will be the same. This is not so 
surprising. After all, it echoes very well the history 
of the last two centuries of international trade 
liberalization.
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Introduction
The world economy is at a critical juncture. On the one hand, the persistent crisis is taking a growing toll on consumers and producers. 
Public and private budget cuts are generating 
impoverished consumers. Moreover, these cuts 
have a very corrosive and too much neglected, 
long-term impact: they induce producers of goods 
and services to retreat to their home markets, 
reducing the level of competition in many markets 
to the detriment of consumers, and generating de 
facto a creeping “de-globalization.”
On the other hand, the United States and the EU 
give no sign of adopting the much needed pro-
growth agenda that would counter-balance the 
recessionary effects of the budget cuts and make 
them more politically sustainable. This silence 
may be due to the fact that such an agenda means 
reforms — a perspective that petrifies current 
politicians. But, if producers and service providers 
want to take the right decisions when redesigning 
their strategies, they need clarity and predictability 
on how their markets will operate in the future.
The best candidates for a pro-growth agenda are 
services, if only because they account for almost 70 
percent of the GDP of the G20 countries. As history 
shows, pro-growth domestic reforms are both 
buttressed and boosted by opening — or reopening 
— domestic markets to foreign competitors. The 
fact that the Doha Round is not an option for 
several years to come should not be an excuse for 
inertia: not opening domestic markets to foreign 
competitors would run the risk of stalling the 
implementation of domestic reform agendas.
As a result, there is an urgent need to start 
international negotiations in services that would 
give service providers the new and clear market 
opportunities they need to grow their businesses. 
The firms that have used this crisis to get in better 
shape will grab these opportunities, in particular in 
the services sectors that have been resilient during 
the three last years, such as computer-related 
services, telecommunications, and insurance 
(Mattoo and Borchert 2009).
This paper explores the costs and benefits of 
transatlantic talks on services liberalization. As 
the United States and the EU are still the largest 
markets in services — though probably for no 
more than a decade or two more — it makes 
sense to start with transatlantic negotiations. This 
paper then reveals the powerful dynamics of such 
talks by showing that it would be relatively cost-
free and highly beneficial to extend these talks to 
roughly eight countries, hence to cover more than 
80 percent of the world production in services. 
This share is large enough to provide huge gains 
for consumers and massive new opportunities 
to service providers. Ultimately, the results of 
such extended talks could then be reinjected into 
multilateral negotiations when the time comes.
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Would transatlantic negotiations on services liberalization raise enough interest among the U.S. and EU service 
providers? Yes, for three reasons:
•	 They will cut the currently relatively high level 
of applied barriers that still prevail in many 
services sectors,
•	 They will increase certainty — a crucial tool for 
fighting crises — in other services by lowering 
the barriers that were bound fifteen years ago 
by the United States and EU in the Uruguay 
Round to the (much) lower level of barriers 
that the United States and EU currently apply,
•	 They will “defragment” the U.S. and EU 
internal markets that remain fragmented 
because most regulations in services are 
designed and implemented by the U.S. states 
(USSs) or by the EU Member States (EUMSs).
The fact that there are three sources of gains 
suggests the existence of strong potential internal 
(in the United States and in the EU) negotiating 
dynamics at work. This section provides some sense 
of the relative magnitude of these three sources of 
gains.
Cutting Applied Protection
A first source of gains for consumers and 
opportunities for service providers consists of 
reducing or cutting the currently applied barriers to 
trade in services. A sense of the magnitude of the 
applied barriers imposed by the EU and the United 
States is provided by the internationally comparable 
OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) 
indicators (OECD 2011). PMR indicators measure 
the degree to which competition is inhibited or 
distorted by regulatory barriers, such as legal and 
administrative barriers to entrepreneurship, state 
control of business enterprises, sector-specific anti-
competitive regulations, etc.
Table 1 presents the available PMR indicators of 
the EU and U.S. regulatory barriers in key services 
for the years 2003 and 2007 (the last year for which 
there are available data). The indicators range 
from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating a completely open 
market and 100 a completely closed market.1 It 
should be stressed that the PMR indicators are not 
equivalent to tariffs: they are mere estimates of the 
existing regulatory barriers in the service sectors 
covered.
Table 1 provides four key results:
•	 There are clearly two groups of services, one 
still substantially protected and one with low or 
moderate regulatory barriers.
•	 The range of services with a substantial 
level of protection (PMRs equal to or higher 
than 20) is almost the same on both sides 
of the Atlantic. This feature is important 
because it allows negotiators to work on deals 
within services as well as between services. 
Exchanging concessions on services pertaining 
to the same broad service sector is usually seen 
as much easier than exchanging concessions 
involving two different broad service sectors.
•	 If one looks at average protection, U.S. services 
look less protected than EU services, though 
not by much.
•	 This difference between the U.S. and EU level 
of protection has decreased between 2003 
and 2007, mirroring unilateral liberalization 
measures taken by the EU — in fact mostly by 
the EUMS, as shown below.
1  The initial range of the PMR indicators used is 0 to 6 from 
least to most restrictive (Conway, Janod and Nicoletti 2005). We 
use a larger range (0 to 100) in order to have a presentation more 
similar to tariff rates. The services with PMR indicators shown 
in Table 1 represent two-thirds of the entire U.S. and EU service 
sectors.
Transatlantic Talks:  
Internal Negotiating Dynamics1
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This picture offers two important lessons in 
political terms. First, it suggests that the United 
States has a clear interest in transatlantic talks (it 
will gain by more open EU markets), a feature 
that would hopefully counter-balance the current 
negative political mood on trade matters among 
some in the U.S. Congress. 
Second, a more protected EU could be seen as 
more hesitant to open services markets than the 
United States. However, two powerful forces will 
counterbalance the possible EU hesitations. The 
economic gains for consumers from reducing or 
eliminating regulatory barriers will be greater in the 
EU than in the United States (the EU barriers being 
higher than the U.S. ones). Indeed, achieving such 
gains drove the unilateral EU liberalization between 
2003 and 2007, and such a motive could be stronger 
in a crisis period characterized by a growing 
number of impoverished consumers. Also, what 
follows shows that the two other benefits that can 
be drawn from transatlantic negotiations — cutting 
bound protection and “defragmenting” the internal 
market — are particularly strong in the EU’s case.
Cutting Bound Protection
Bound regulatory barriers are those defined by 
the commitments taken in the WTO by countries. 
They are the only ones enjoying legal force. Applied 
Table 1: Applied regulatory barriers in U.S. and EU selected services (2003 and 2007)
Sources: OECD (2011). Authors’ calculations.
Notes:  PMR indicators vary from 0 (markets considered as open) to 100 (markets considered as closed). [a] Simple average of the 
PMR indicators for 18 EUMS, including four Central European EU Member States. [b] Simple average of the PMR excluding the four 
Central European EU Member States.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
2007
United 
States
30.6 4.7 22.4 4.2 19.5 19.2 25.3 2.6 17.0 14.9 16.0
EU-14 [a] 23.5 7.0 29.3 6.3 24.1 19.5 22.1 3.0 24.6 23.9 18.3
EU-18 [b] 23.5 7.2 27.6 7.0 24.0 20.9 25.7 3.4 25.7 25.0 19.0
2003
United 
States
38.3 4.7 22.5 4.3 19.5 19.6 25.3 2.7 17.0 15.0 16.9
EU-14 [a] 31.7 7.5 29.8 6.8 29.2 23.9 22.4 3.1 25.0 24.3 20.4
EU-18 [b] 31.7 7.9 28.5 7.8 30.7 25.1 26.1 3.8 26.2 25.6 21.3
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regulatory barriers can be lower (but not higher) 
than the corresponding bound barriers. Indeed, as 
most EU and U.S. commitments in services date 
from the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1995, 
the EU and the United States have had ample time 
to adopt and to apply (much) lower regulatory 
barriers — all the more because these two large 
and complex economies rely on federal or quasi-
federal political structures allowing their member 
states to adopt more or less open regulations and to 
implement them in a more or less open manner.
When applied barriers are lower than bound 
barriers, trade liberalization offers a second — 
often neglected — source of gains for consumers 
and opportunities for service providers: lowering 
the bound regulatory barriers to their applied level 
eliminates the so-called “water in protection” in 
services.2 Water in protection looks innocuous. 
It is not. It is highly toxic, particularly in a crisis 
period, because differences between applied and 
bound rates allow governments to resort to higher 
protection that can be:
•	 fast since there is no fear of breaching 
WTO obligations, hence of being obliged to 
compensate or to face retaliations as long as, 
once increased, the applied level of protection 
remains lower or equal to the bound level;
•	 huge in the sectors where bound protection is 
much higher than applied protection; and
2  A detailed analysis of the notion of “water in protection” in 
services is beyond the scope of this paper. It is more complicated 
than the parallel notion in goods (the difference between bound 
and applied tariffs). This is because a country’s schedule in a 
specific service is defined by eight entries (four modes in market 
access and four modes in national treatment). However, it is 
recognized that the “elements of the schedule operate exactly in 
the same way as a GATT binding” since “they represent bound 
commitments that, when the service concerned is supplied by 
the specified mode, it will receive treatment no less favorable 
than is stated in the schedule” (WTO Secretariat 1999, page 
182).
•	 widely spread since there are many large 
sectors with water in protection.
The recent months have made some parts of 
the business community aware of the high costs 
associated with the uncertainty generated by water 
in protection in the industrial sector.3
The “value of binding” — cutting bound barriers 
to their applied levels, hence to ban the possibility 
of reversals — is thus a second source of gains 
from the transatlantic negotiations in services. 
Table 2 gives a crude sense of the magnitude of 
water in protection in the EU services. It provides 
this information only for the EU simply because 
there are no equivalent available data for the USSs. 
However, evidence from U.S. GATS commitments 
(with their USS-specific exceptions in insurance, 
financial and legal services and, to a lesser extent, 
engineering, accounting and bookkeeping, and, 
more indirectly, in public procurement) and from 
the business community itself suggests that similar 
water in protection in services also exists within the 
United States.
Table 2 provides the highest and lowest PMR 
indicators for the 18 EUMS covered by the OECD 
study for the years 2003 and 2007. It gives a sense of 
the value of binding if one assumes that the applied 
PMR for the most protected EUMS is close to the 
level of protection in this service that the EU has 
bound under the Uruguay Round — a reasonable 
proposition. Two estimates of the value of binding 
can be calculated for each service sector:
•	 the difference between the highest and lowest 
PMR in 2007; and
•	 the difference between the highest PMR in 
2003 and the lowest one in 2007.
3  For more detail on such costs, see Messerlin (2007, 2008), 
Bouët and Laborde (2008), Achard, Rupp and Jomini (2008), 
Productivity Commission (2010), OECD-WTO UNCTAD 
Report (2011).
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The second estimate captures the unilateral 
liberalization undertaken by the various EUMS 
since the Uruguay Round. Indeed, the wide range 
of PMR within the EU strongly suggests that such 
liberalizations remain largely driven by individual 
EUMS decisions.
Table 2 suggests four main observations on the 
value of binding (remembering that PMRs are mere 
indicators, not tariff-like figures):
•	 It is huge in absolute terms for the most 
protected services, even if one values water in 
protection on the basis of the 2007 PMRs.
•	 It is huge in relative terms for the most open 
services.
•	 It has increased substantially between 2003 
and 2007, reflecting EUMSs’ unilateral 
liberalizations.
•	 It is high for those services that the WTO’s 
2008 signaling exercise has suggested as best 
candidates for negotiations: business services, 
communication services, and distribution (see 
Section 3 below).
In short, reducing or eliminating water in 
protection in the EU and in the United States would 
Table 2: The value of binding: water in protection across EUMS, 2003 and 2007
Sources:  OECD (2011). Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The value of binding is defined as (i) the difference between the highest and lowest PMR in 2007, or as (ii) the difference 
between the 2003 highest PMR and the 2007 lowest PMR. The highest PMR are taken as proxies of the bound regulatory protection. 
The proposition that the 2003 highest PMR is the closest from the Uruguay Round bound level of protection seems reasonable. [a] 
These two services are among the best candidates for liberalization negotiations according to the signaling exercise (see Section 3).
PMR 2003 PMR 2007
Value of binding in 
2007 based on
Highest
EUMS
Lowest 
EUMS
Highest 
EUMS
Lowest 
EUMS
2003 2007
Electricity 60.0 0.0 41.7 0.0 60.0 41.7
Construction 12.8 4.0 12.2 3.6 9.2 8.6
Distribution 41.5 13.0 40.9 12.7 28.8 28.2
Tourism 16.5 3.8 13.2 3.4 13.1 9.8
Transport 55.8 11.2 43.8 9.1 46.7 34.7
Post & telecoms 32.6 15.8 27.8 12.0 20.6 15.8
Financial 
services
46.8 10.9 45.9 10.5 36.3 35.4
Real estate 
activities
9.5 1.6 7.6 1.5 8.0 6.1
Renting of 
machinery
42.4 10.9 42.0 10.5 31.9 31.5
Prof. & business 
services
41.3 10.4 40.8 10.0 31.3 30.9
The Dynamics of Transatlantic Negotiations in Services 9
therefore provide large opportunities to U.S. and 
EU service providers and huge benefits to their 
consumers.
“Defragmenting” the EU and U.S. Internal 
Services Markets: Internal Negotiating 
Dynamics
The approach in terms of water in protection 
reveals a third source of benefits from opening 
markets that is also largely ignored. Table 3 presents 
the same information as Table 2, but it specifies the 
EUMS with the highest PMR, the EUMS among 
the four largest EUMS with the highest PMR, the 
number of EUMSs having a PMR within the range 
of the two previous PMRs, and the EUMS with the 
lowest PMR. The information on the large EUMS 
and on the number of EUMSs having a PMR 
within the range of the two previous PMRs is key 
for having a sense of the political weight of EUMS 
vested interests opposed to liberalization.
Table 3 reveals how much the “EU internal market” 
for any service covered is “fragmented,” a point 
confirmed by a rigorous analysis (Miroudot and 
Shepherd 2011). If it were possible for U.S. firms to 
export their services from a relatively open EUMS 
to the most protected EUMSs, then U.S. service 
providers would establish their activities in the 
most open EUMS and operate from it toward the 
most protected ones (the rest of the EU). In such 
a case, keeping high barriers would make little 
Table 3. Fragmented internal markets: the EU case (2007)
Source: OECD (2011). Notes: [a] The “large” EUMSs are Britain, France, Germany and Italy. [b] Number of EUMSs with a PMR within 
the range of PMRs in the two previous columns. [c] No PMRs are available for the Central European EUMSs. [d] These two services 
are among the best candidates for liberalization negotiations according to the 2008 WTO signaling exercise (see below section 3).
A: Highest PMR
B: Highest PMR in 
large EUMSs [a]
Number 
of EUMS 
between 
the A and B
C: Lowest PMR
PMR EUMS PMR EUMS PMR EUMS
Electricity [c] 41.7 Sweden 33.2 France 3 0.0 Britain
Construction 12.2 Belgium 10.0 Italy 0 3.6 Sweden
Distribution [d] 40.9 France 40.9 France 0 12.7 Sweden
Tourism 13.2 Slovakia 7.6 Italy 3 3.4 Sweden
Transport 43.8 Greece 28.9 Italy 3 9.1 Denmark
Post & 
telecoms
27.8 Slovakia 24.2 France 2 12.0 Netherlands
Financial 
services
45.9 Slovakia 29.4 Italy 2 10.5 Ireland
Real estate 7.6 Poland 4.3 Germany 3 1.5 Greece
Renting of 
machinery
42.0 Austria 39.2 Germany 0 10.5 Sweden
Prof. & 
business 
services [d]
40.8 Austria 38.5 Germany 0 10.0 Sweden
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sense for the most protected EUMS. The survival 
of high PMR across EUMS is thus the sign that the 
EU internal market remains very fragmented. Of 
course, the same story could probably be told for 
the United States, the only question being whether 
the range of the value of binding among the USSs 
would be similar or lower than the one among the 
EUMS.
This observation has a crucial consequence in 
terms of transatlantic negotiating dynamics. 
It implies that U.S. service providers and the 
service providers from the most open EUMS 
have converging interests: to build a coalition 
for opening the markets of the most protected 
EUMSs. As once again a symmetrical story is 
likely to prevail in the United States, transatlantic 
negotiations in services could thus trigger very 
interesting coalitions between the most open USSs 
and EUMSs against the most protected USSs and 
EUMSs on both sides of the Atlantic in every 
service with significant water in protection (in 
relative terms). Such coalitions have the power to 
deliver substantial deals.
In fact, such a “defragmenting” motive for 
transatlantic talks is not a new story. It was already 
at work in the EU during the Kennedy Round. 
In the early 1960s, the most protected EUMSs 
became reluctant to reduce their highest tariffs to 
the (much) lower level of the Common External 
Tariff. Improved market access to the United States 
and to other GATT industrial country members 
was attractive enough for these reluctant EUMS to 
implement the Common External Tariff.
Negative Lists and Ratchet Provisions
These balanced potential gains from liberalization 
favor the introduction of two negotiating devices 
that would strengthen the quality of the services 
agreements from both a static and a dynamic 
dimension.
First, potential balanced gains make easier the use 
of “negative lists” that name only the services to be 
exempted from the disciplines of the agreement. 
Such a device offers a much clearer view of what 
is effectively liberalized — everything except what 
is listed as nonliberalized at the signature of the 
agreement. This is the static dimension. This is in 
sharp contrast with “positive lists” that name the 
services to be liberalized. Positive lists often require 
that service providers have a deep knowledge 
of what has not been liberalized but is crucial 
for taking advantage of the agreed liberalization 
measure. As a result, positive lists impose high costs 
on newcomers and tend to considerably weaken 
the pro-competitive effect of the liberalization 
measures.
Second, potential balanced gains also make 
easier the introduction of ratchet provisions that 
would specify the conditions locking in any new 
liberalization measure so that this measure could 
not be revoked or nullified over time, be it in part 
or in totality. This is the dynamic dimension.
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Transatlantic talks in services will also be subjected to external negotiating dynamics, that is, they will induce other countries to 
join them. “Plurilaterals” (agreements among 
several countries) in services are often suggested 
as the way to solve the difficult problems of 
negotiating services liberalization that the WTO 
has been unable to solve. However, such a proposal 
assumes that a dozen or so countries will suddenly 
find the energy and willingness to negotiate in 
services after having failed to do so in the WTO 
during more than ten years — a not-so convincing 
proposition.
This section suggests a more plausible process for 
generating plurilaterals in services. The most likely 
scenario is that two countries decide to initiate 
bilateral negotiations. If they are large enough — 
as the United States and the EU are — and if the 
prospect of a successful outcome is high enough, 
then there will be strong dynamic forces that will 
induce these bilateral negotiations to become 
plurilateral, and ultimately multilateral. That said, 
shifting from a bilateral to a plurilateral forum 
depends on two factors: the costs and benefits from 
expanding the negotiations.
Keeping the Cost of Expansion Low 
The costs of negotiations are likely to remain 
low if the number of countries willing to join 
the EU-U.S. negotiations is limited. But, at the 
same time, limiting the number of participants 
is optimal only as long as the negotiating parties 
represent a “critical mass” of the world service 
sector in question. The needed “critical mass” that 
is often mentioned in the WTO is 80 percent of 
world trade. But, a criterion based on trade shares 
is not appropriate in services that are not yet 
traded as routinely as goods (if only because of all 
the remaining barriers). A much better criterion 
Figure 1: Shifting to Plurilaterals: How Many Additional Countries to get a Critical Mass?
Source:  OECD (2011, 2006)
Notes:  Total services includes public administration and defense, health and social services, private households services which are 
not shown separately in Figure 1. 
Expanding Transatlantic Talks: 
External Negotiating Dynamics2
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appears to be the output (“value-added” in the 
National Accounts parlance) shares in services.
Figure 1 provides the cumulated shares of the 
value-added produced in 17 services, based on the 
OECD normalized Input-Output tables. It presents 
these data for the 19 largest economies (except 
Hong Kong for which there is no data; for more 
detail, see Annex 1).
Figure 1 shows that the additional economies 
needed for reaching a significant critical mass 
can be divided into two different groups (leaving 
aside the United States and the EU). First, there is 
the “Top 8” group, which includes Japan, China, 
India, Brazil, Russia, Canada, Korea, and Mexico. 
This group, plus the United States and the EU, 
represents roughly 80 percent of world value-
added (production) in almost all services. All 
these core countries are likely to be interested in a 
plurilateral agreement. As it is quite a small number 
of countries, the costs of such an extension appears 
quite manageable from a negotiating perspective.
A second group, called the “Occasional 9” 
economies, play a notable role in some services 
sectors — in particular, Taiwan, Turkey, and 
Australia. They can thus provide an additional 
coverage of the world value-added and constitute a 
broader circle of negotiating partners to be involved 
in extended negotiations in services if some of the 
Top 8 countries are initially reluctant to join the 
negotiations.
The Benefits of Expanding: Huge
What would be the benefits of shifting to 
plurilateral negotiations for the EU and the 
United States? Figure 1 shows that the Top 8 and 
Occasional 9 groups represent a substantial share 
of the world services sectors: they amount to an 
additional consolidated market often larger than 
the U.S. or EU markets. Shifting to a plurilateral 
deal would thus very substantially increase the 
gains for European and U.S. consumers and the 
opportunities for their firms.
These benefits depend also on the level of 
regulatory barriers of the Top 8 and Occasional 
9 groups. Table 4 presents the applied regulatory 
barriers for the six countries for which the OECD is 
calculating the PMRs (four of the Top 8 group, and 
two for the Occasional 9 group). It suggests three 
main results:
•	 Some of these countries have undertaken 
unilateral liberalizations in some services 
between 2003 and 2007: Japan in electricity, 
Korea and Mexico in transport.
•	 Australia exhibits a level of protection roughly 
similar to the United States and EU. If one 
leaves aside electricity (because of a lack of 
data), Korea and Mexico exhibit an average 
level of protection similar to that of the EU.
•	 Canada and Japan are more complicated to 
interpret. Both seem to have services that are 
more protected than those of the EU. But, the 
EU PMRs are simple averages of the EUMS 
PMRs. It happens that Japan and Canada are 
almost always less protected than the most 
protected EUMSs in most services [Messerlin 
2012]. This situation generates additional 
coalitions interested in “defragmenting” the EU 
(U.S.) Internal Market.
All these results suggest the EU and the United 
States have a clear economic interest in extending 
their bilateral talks to the Top 8 (and Occasional 9) 
group — illustrating the gains to be expected from 
“additive” regionalism (Harrison, Rutherford and 
Tarr 2002).
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Table 4: Extending the Negotiations to the Top 8 and Occasional 9 Groups
Source:  OECD (2008), OECD (2006), World Bank (World Trade Indicators). Authors’ calculations.
Notes: For both bound and applied regulatory barriers indicators vary from 0 (markets considered as open) to 100 (markets 
considered as closed). The EU level of regulatory barriers in services are averages weighted by the output shares of the EU services 
sectors. All shares are based on output data from the National Accounts (input-output tables) for the year 2000. The share of services 
covered (last row) is the output of the services for which there is information on the levels of barriers as a share of output in all the 
services. Note that for education, the share of output in R&D is included following input-output tables. 
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The Top 8 Group
2007
Japan 26.9 10.3 45.2 11.2 28.0 23.6 24.0 2.9 30.1 29.4 23.2
Canada 55.6 6.9 24.4 6.5 24.5 26.5 29.9 3.6 31.4 30.2 23.9
Korea (na) 5.7 14.1 5.0 31.2 26.1 30.1 4.4 22.2 21.6 --
Mexico (na) 5.5 20.2 5.3 23.5 27.5 29.1 2.0 21.5 21.6 --
2003
Japan 35.0 10.4 45.3 11.5 26.9 25.6 24.1 2.9 30.2 29.6 24.2
Canada 55.0 6.9 24.3 6.4 23.0 25.6 29.8 3.6 31.4 30.1 23.6
Korea (na) 5.8 14.2 5.1 34.9 26.4 30.2 2.5 22.3 21.7 --
Mexico (na) 5.7 20.3 5.4 28.6 27.6 29.2 2.0 21.6 21.7 --
The Occasional 9 Group
2007
Australia 25.0 4.3 15.9 5.8 13.8 21.0 29.8 3.2 21.5 20.4 16.1
Turkey (na) 10.5 33.9 10.1 48.6 32.0 27.7 2.7 32.7 32.4 --
2003
Australia 25.0 4.6 16.3 6.2 16.2 23.6 29.9 3.4 21.9 20.8 16.8
Turkey (na) 10.3 33.9 10.0 42.5 44.2 27.9 2.7 32.7 32.4 --
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Negotiating Dynamics
That said, would there then be any interest among 
members of the Top 8 (and Occasional 9) group to 
join the U.S.-EU negotiations? The answer is yes for 
three reasons:
The consumers of these countries would benefit 
from the enormous welfare gains associated with 
such a wide liberalization.
Expanding the negotiations would reveal the 
comparative advantages of emerging service 
providers in the Top 8 (and Occasional 9) group. 
There is no reason to believe that emerging 
economies would have comparative advantages 
in goods only. They will almost necessarily have 
comparative advantages in some services. The 
earlier these advantages are revealed, the better it 
is for the Top 8 (and Occasional 9) countries. And, 
the better it is also for the United States and EU: 
the United States and the EU have no interest in 
building up or expanding services in which they 
have no comparative advantages, if only to avoid 
costly adjustment processes in the years to come.
Last, but not least, not joining the EU-U.S. 
negotiations would impose a substantial cost 
on nonparticipants. As services are regulation-
intensive, leaving the EU-U.S. negotiators in a 
tête-à-tête would raise the risk that these two largest 
economies would set international regulatory 
norms tailored closely to their own interests. Such a 
situation could be costly for late-comers who would 
not make their voices heard in time. In this crucial 
respect, negotiations in services are quite different 
from those on tariffs imposed on goods, where 
joining later does not raise such risks.
These dynamic forces that should induce the EU 
and the United States to extend their transatlantic 
talks to roughly a dozen of countries are essential 
because they justify the risk of initiating bilateral 
(transatlantic) talks soon. Leading by example 
is necessitated by the current debilitating lack 
of appetite for WTO negotiations, notably in 
the United States. But economic analysis shows 
that a strictly transatlantic deal is unlikely to be 
optimal because it risks distorting trade flows.4 
The dynamic forces pushing for extending the 
transatlantic talks to the Top 8 group would 
considerably reduce such risks.
4  If the barriers imposed by the EU and the United States on 
imports of services from the rest of the world are as high as 
those they impose on each other’s imports (a likely assumption), 
EU and U.S. service providers can charge high prices in their 
partner’s markets — and they are inclined to do it by necessity 
(when they are less efficient than service providers located in the 
rest of he world) or by lucrative rent-seeking (when they are as 
efficient). As a result, EU and U.S. consumers could not get the 
gains to be expected from more competitive markets. Rather, 
they would de facto “subsidize” the inefficient service providers 
of the trading partner or to pay high rents to the efficient 
service providers on the other side of the Atlantic. Sometimes, 
it is argued that the capacity of bilateral agreements in services 
to be really discriminatory (that is, to open a market to the 
signatory of the bilateral and to close the same market to all the 
other countries) is limited. That may be the case (it is a matter 
of judgment or depends on the circumstances), but it does not 
eliminate the potential risks described above.
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The most recent indication of the willingness to negotiate in services remains the July 2008 “Signaling Conference” held under 
the aegis of the Doha Round negotiations. In 
the course of only one day, negotiators from 31 
countries (including the EC, the United States, 
and all the countries of the Top 8 group, except 
Russia) signaled their offers to open domestic 
Is there Any Appetite for Plurilateral 
Negotiations?3
Table 5: Revealing the Willingness to Negotiate: The State of the World, July 2008
Source:  TNC Chairman’s Report of 30 July 2008; OECD (2006); Mattoo and Borchert (2009).
Notes:  [a] 31 WTO Members participate to the Signaling Conference. [b] Data cover the United States, EU and 
Top 8 group. [c] As reported by Mattoo and Borchert.
Services
Signalling Conference 2008
Size of sectors 
[b] (US$ bn)
3
Crisis 
resilience [c]
4
Number of WTO 
participants [a]
1
GATS mode 
underlined
2
Business 
Services
Virtually all 4 4918 High
Communication 
Services 
Substantial 3 737 High
Distribution 
Services 
Substantial 3 3809 --
Environmental 
Services 
Substantial 3 -- --
Construction 
& Related 
Engineering
Substantial 3 & 4 1715 High
Transport 
Services 
Substantial 3 1282 Low
Financial 
Services
Notable 3 1770 Low to High
Educational 
Services 
Notable 3 & 4 1444 --
Tourism and 
Travel Related 
Services 
A few 774 Low
Health and 
Social Services 
A few 3 & 4 1483 --
Recreational, 
Cultural & 
Sporting
A couple -- 1217 --
Energy Substantial 3 -- --
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services markets, and their requests to get better 
market access to foreign services. The Conference 
was unanimously considered a success, many 
participants showing an unexpectedly strong 
appetite for negotiating improved market access in 
services.
Unfortunately, the Chairman’s Report does not give 
any precise information on the offers and requests. 
It does not even mention the names of the countries 
specifically interested in each service. However, it 
sheds some “qualitative” light on the intensity and 
scope of the services to be liberalized among WTO 
members.
Table 5 summarizes this information in the two 
first columns. Column 1 gives a sense of how 
many participants manifested a serious interest 
in negotiations during the Signaling Conference. 
Column 2 focuses on the interest shown for two 
modes: mode 3 on the right of establishment and 
mode 4 on the movement of natural persons. 
These two modes were the most contentious 
issues during the Uruguay Round negotiations, 
and, during the Doha Round negotiations, service 
providers have repeatedly underlined the necessity 
to include them in the negotiations. The two 
columns reveal a willingness to negotiate, with 
a high number of participants interested in each 
service, a high occurrence of offers and requests 
on mode 3, and even a willingness to include 
mode 4 (by far, the most contentious aspect of any 
international negotiation in services because it is 
often misperceived as a possible source of illegal 
immigration).
Columns 3 and 4 provide important information 
from an economic perspective. Column 3 gives 
the total (United States, EU, and Top 8 group) 
market size of the services listed in US$ billions 
at the purchasing power parity exchange rates. 
Market sizes are a key factor determining the 
magnitude of consumers’ welfare gains and of 
firms’ opportunities, hence the likelihood and 
magnitude of the negotiation success. That the size 
of the agricultural and industrial markets for the 
ten countries amounts to roughly $8 trillion gives a 
sense of the size of the services market, compared 
to the rest of the economy.
Combining tables 4 and 5 suggests attractive 
matches between the declared willingness to 
negotiate and the economic forces at work. 
In particular, it reveals three services sectors 
— business services, communications, and 
distribution — as a rich potential source of 
negotiating successes: these sectors are large and 
relatively highly protected.
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Conclusion4
The total output of the three services that benefit from a clear willingness to negotiate — business services, communications 
services, and distribution — in the ten largest 
countries is larger than the entire output of 
agricultural and industrial goods in these countries. 
In other words, liberalizing these services sectors 
is an endeavor equivalent to the entirety of global 
trade liberalization of the past 50 years.
Thus, a transatlantic initiative on services expanded 
to include less than a dozen countries offers the 
prospect of considerable gains for consumers 
and opportunities for producers on both sides of 
the Atlantic and in the world. This encouraging 
conclusion raises two questions.
First, how to manage the expansion of the 
negotiating process? There are several options 
[Cooke 2011]:
•	 The EU-U.S. initiative could be MFN-based 
from its start
•	 It could be based on benefits confined to 
participants until it reaches some threshold 
(for instance, 80 percent of world GDP) and 
then become MFN-based; or
•	 It could be based on benefits confined to 
participants.
The choice is crucial for two reasons. It will define 
the level of trust among the “willing” — hence, 
the more or less intensive use of a “negative lists” 
approach (only the listed services are exempted 
from the disciplines of the agreement). It will 
also determine the intensity of the use of ratchet 
provisions (reservations would automatically 
disappear if a reserved barrier were reduced or 
eliminated) that is the best way to limit the creation 
of water in protection. 
Second, this paper is based on the proposition that 
the United States and the EU are the “obvious” 
candidates to launch a liberalization process. 
This may not be necessarily the case, however. 
Alternatives are emerging: Transpacific initiatives 
in services (APEC or TPP), East-Asia initiatives, 
and Asia-Europe initiatives. All these options 
share one common feature: as soon as one of these 
dialogs takes off, the dynamic forces evoked above 
will induce the nonparticipating largest economies 
to join the ongoing talks. In other words, the 
starting point of the whole process may be 
different, but the dynamic effects will be the same.
This last observation is not so surprising. After 
all, it echoes very well the history of the last two 
centuries of international trade liberalization.
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Transatlantic 
Partners
USA 26.0 17.3 29.1 27.5 24.6 20.5 26.4 27.2 18.4 11.0 40.3 8.7 29.6 33.1 31.3 32.8 34.9 67.4 18.6 40.1 7.0 33.4 42.7 USA
EU19 23.8 20.6 25.0 24.6 20.1 6.5 39.4 33.9 23.8 22.3 29.0 19.8 29.3 25.3 46.9 23.2 19.3 26.3 26.8 31.3 7.6 38.6 19.8 38.7 30.8 22.2 41.5 EU19
Top 8 Japan 7.6 5.2 8.5 8.8 6.4 17.9 18.3 16.2 9.5 8.9 8.8 7.9 14.1 4.0 10.6 8.2 7.0 9.7 14.9 10.1 8.1 7.7 5.6 11.1 8.7 8.7 4.7 Japan
China 7.4 16.0 4.2 5.0 13.9 13.0 8.4 4.0 5.3 9.1 6.5 5.2 1.6 7.4 2.6 5.2 1.2 0.5 China 
India 3.5 6.0 2.6 2.7 4.0 4.7 4.6 3.6 3.6 1.3 5.5 5.9 1.2 1.4 2.2 3.6 1.6 2.2 0.3 2.8 4.8 0.9 1.8 India 
Mexico 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.9 1.5 6.3 3.2 3.5 3.2 5.4 1.0 1.2 2.9 3.0 1.2 3.0 2.5 0.1 4.0 1.5 4.8 1.8 1.3 5.0 Mexico
Brazil 2.7 3.2 2.5 2.4 3.4 4.8 5.5 4.1 1.5 1.8 1.3 0.7 2.2 2.8 2.9 2.4 3.6 0.3 1.1 1.5 5.5 2.1 0.6 1.1 8.8 Brazil 
Russia 2.6 3.3 2.3 2.8 3.5 30.2 3.1 6.3 7.7 2.7 2.0 0.3 2.7 1.8 Russia
Canada 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.4 6.8 1.9 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.3 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.6 1.9 2.3 2.7 2.0 3.3 1.1 1.7 1.7 Canada
Korea 1.9 2.3 1.8 1.9 1.9 3.9 23.1 2.6 2.5 1.2 2.0 1.5 2.6 1.7 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.3 0.2 1.8 2.1 1.3 2.8 1.6 0.7 1.9 Korea
Occasional 9 Turkey 1.4 1.9 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 3.2 1.8 1.7 1.6 3.9 4.9 2.4 1.4 1.1 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.5 1.5 0.2 0.4 0.5 14.2 Turkey
Indonesia 1.3 2.6 5.8 1.5 4.7 1.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 Indonesia
Taiwan 1.1 1.1 1.4 3.4 1.9 1.3 1.6 1.3 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.6 1.8 0.7 1.1 2.9 Taiwan
Australia 1.0 2.5 3.5 1.1 2.7 3.0 1.4 1.5 2.1 1.1 1.7 1.2 1.3 Australia
Argentina 0.7 2.0 1.2 0.7 1.1 0.6 1.0 4.3 Argentina
South Africa 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.4 South Africa
Switzerland 0.6 5.0 0.9 0.1 0.7 1.5 Switzerland
Norway 0.4 4.7 0.1 Norway
Israel 0.2 Israel
Summary Transatlantic 49.8 37.9 54.1 52.1 44.8 6.5 39.4 33.9 44.3 48.7 56.2 38.2 40.3 65.6 55.6 52.8 52.4 57.5 59.6 66.2 75.0 57.2 59.9 45.6 64.2 65.0 41.5 Transatlantic
Top 8 30.6 41.1 26.8 28.7 37.0 74.6 41.5 41.8 36.4 31.4 24.4 40.3 25.6 12.9 22.6 27.6 26.7 24.3 22.0 16.0 11.9 26.1 21.3 34.3 18.5 17.2 22.6 Top 8
Occ 9 7.4 4.5 1.2 1.3 1.3 5.9 7.0 9.3 3.0 3.1 3.0 5.3 17.7 7.0 5.8 3.8 3.2 2.8 6.0 4.2 1.2 3.0 2.9 4.7 3.6 3.8 23.6 Occ 9
Annex6
Table A1: “Top 8” and “Occasional 9” Groups 
Shifting to Plurilaterals: How Many Additional Countries?
Source:  OECD (2006).
Notes:  (a) This column shows the widest definition of services (codes 26 to 48). (b) This column shows a narrower definition 
(codes 26 to 43 and 45, hence excluding the following services: Public administration and defense; Compulsory social security; Other 
community, social & personal services; Health & social work; Private households with employed persons & extra-territorial organiza-
tions & bodies. (c) Note that many U.S. educational services are included in Research and Development services. (d) The Top 8 econo-
mies are the largest economies in terms of GDP, ranked by decreasing order. (e) The 9 Occasional economies are the subsequent largest 
economies in terms of GDP, ranked by decreasing order.
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Transatlantic 
Partners
USA 26.0 17.3 29.1 27.5 24.6 20.5 26.4 27.2 18.4 11.0 40.3 8.7 29.6 33.1 31.3 32.8 34.9 67.4 18.6 40.1 7.0 33.4 42.7 USA
EU19 23.8 20.6 25.0 24.6 20.1 6.5 39.4 33.9 23.8 22.3 29.0 19.8 29.3 25.3 46.9 23.2 19.3 26.3 26.8 31.3 7.6 38.6 19.8 38.7 30.8 22.2 41.5 EU19
Top 8 Japan 7.6 5.2 8.5 8.8 6.4 17.9 18.3 16.2 9.5 8.9 8.8 7.9 14.1 4.0 10.6 8.2 7.0 9.7 14.9 10.1 8.1 7.7 5.6 11.1 8.7 8.7 4.7 Japan
China 7.4 16.0 4.2 5.0 13.9 13.0 8.4 4.0 5.3 9.1 6.5 5.2 1.6 7.4 2.6 5.2 1.2 0.5 China 
India 3.5 6.0 2.6 2.7 4.0 4.7 4.6 3.6 3.6 1.3 5.5 5.9 1.2 1.4 2.2 3.6 1.6 2.2 0.3 2.8 4.8 0.9 1.8 India 
Mexico 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.9 1.5 6.3 3.2 3.5 3.2 5.4 1.0 1.2 2.9 3.0 1.2 3.0 2.5 0.1 4.0 1.5 4.8 1.8 1.3 5.0 Mexico
Brazil 2.7 3.2 2.5 2.4 3.4 4.8 5.5 4.1 1.5 1.8 1.3 0.7 2.2 2.8 2.9 2.4 3.6 0.3 1.1 1.5 5.5 2.1 0.6 1.1 8.8 Brazil 
Russia 2.6 3.3 2.3 2.8 3.5 30.2 3.1 6.3 7.7 2.7 2.0 0.3 2.7 1.8 Russia
Canada 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.4 6.8 1.9 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.3 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.6 1.9 2.3 2.7 2.0 3.3 1.1 1.7 1.7 Canada
Korea 1.9 2.3 1.8 1.9 1.9 3.9 23.1 2.6 2.5 1.2 2.0 1.5 2.6 1.7 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.3 0.2 1.8 2.1 1.3 2.8 1.6 0.7 1.9 Korea
Occasional 9 Turkey 1.4 1.9 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 3.2 1.8 1.7 1.6 3.9 4.9 2.4 1.4 1.1 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.5 1.5 0.2 0.4 0.5 14.2 Turkey
Indonesia 1.3 2.6 5.8 1.5 4.7 1.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 Indonesia
Taiwan 1.1 1.1 1.4 3.4 1.9 1.3 1.6 1.3 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.6 1.8 0.7 1.1 2.9 Taiwan
Australia 1.0 2.5 3.5 1.1 2.7 3.0 1.4 1.5 2.1 1.1 1.7 1.2 1.3 Australia
Argentina 0.7 2.0 1.2 0.7 1.1 0.6 1.0 4.3 Argentina
South Africa 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.4 South Africa
Switzerland 0.6 5.0 0.9 0.1 0.7 1.5 Switzerland
Norway 0.4 4.7 0.1 Norway
Israel 0.2 Israel
Summary Transatlantic 49.8 37.9 54.1 52.1 44.8 6.5 39.4 33.9 44.3 48.7 56.2 38.2 40.3 65.6 55.6 52.8 52.4 57.5 59.6 66.2 75.0 57.2 59.9 45.6 64.2 65.0 41.5 Transatlantic
Top 8 30.6 41.1 26.8 28.7 37.0 74.6 41.5 41.8 36.4 31.4 24.4 40.3 25.6 12.9 22.6 27.6 26.7 24.3 22.0 16.0 11.9 26.1 21.3 34.3 18.5 17.2 22.6 Top 8
Occ 9 7.4 4.5 1.2 1.3 1.3 5.9 7.0 9.3 3.0 3.1 3.0 5.3 17.7 7.0 5.8 3.8 3.2 2.8 6.0 4.2 1.2 3.0 2.9 4.7 3.6 3.8 23.6 Occ 9
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